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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Title of Dissertation: Towards Efficient Port Pricing: A Specific look 
into South African Tariff Methodology 
 
Degree:   MSc 
 
South African trade with the rest of the world is primarily through the ports, given the 
geographical location of the country, its resources and trade partners. The competitiveness of 
the national ports therefore has a direct bearing on the competitiveness of the trade industry. 
The South African economy would be severely constrained without the necessary ports 
infrastructure in place, however, the efficiency of that infrastructure and pricing to use the 
infrastructure are of critical importance. In recent times industry participants and government 
have raised a concern about skewed pricing and high rates of the South African ports. 
The management structure of the port, elasticity of demand for port service and the source of 
port funding determine the method used for port pricing. This thesis serves to examine how 
the factors of the port pricing of the South African ports system can be used to achieve 
efficient port pricing. A number of shortcomings of the currently applied pricing model were 
discovered and discussed but the primary shortcoming is that the model provides inadequate 
incentives for the port management to apply effort in order to maximise efficiency. After 
considering the current pricing system and how the users are affected, the most critical 
element to pricing in South African ports is the requirement for practical encouragement of 
intra-port and inter-port competition. 
It was also discovered that costs alone, especially accounting based costs that the tariff model 
is based, should not determine the tariffs levels. Therefore a pricing method that incorporates 
other objectives should be considered, hence the suggested CPV approach. This method of 
pricing will afford the port authority to pursue multiple objectives that will be beneficial to 
the authority, its customers and the country as a whole. 
 
 
KEYWORDS : Port Pricing, port competition, price elasticity of demand, revenue 
requirement  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The demand for transport services is derived from demand for goods and is consequently a 
function of industrial production, economic growth, and international trade (Meersman, et al., 
2002). Any improvements in the economic efficiency of a seaport will improve economic 
welfare by increasing the producers’ surplus for the originators of the goods being 
transported and consumers’ surplus for the final consumers of the goods being imported” 
(Goss, 1990) Pricing of ports is significant in the choice of port decision, in terms of 
generalised port of call costs. Generalised cost is the sum of amount paid, costs of delays, 
time costs, and the risk of damage or loss. The impacts that can be realised by the economy 
from inefficient ports can be substantial. As competition among intermodal routes of the 
logistics chains increases, the efforts of ports to establish a competitive advantage that allows 
them to remain in business also increases. Previously, geographical location of a particular 
port, the depth of the port’s navigational channel or the security offered by the port was often 
enough to provide a competitive edge, to date, this is no longer adequate. In the present day, 
competitive advantage is derived from providing better services to port users.  
 
Ports form part of a chain thus focusing on port costs is a device to examine a component of 
South African logistics costs because ports serve not to only the strategic role of trade 
facilitation, but also help to shape the economic growth and development of the entire 
Southern African region. There have been concerns raised that the port prices are high and 
continue to increase because the pricing model incentivises port price levels that are not at the 
interest of the country. This has attracted attention on the topic with initiatives to provide 
solutions being required. The main question that this thesis serves to address is how an 
efficient pricing system can be executed in the South African ports sector, taking into account 
the objectives and constraints of the port system. This thesis will base its investigation on the 
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notion that the management structure of the port, elasticity of demand for port services, and 
the source of port funding determines the method used for port pricing. These factors will be 
examined individually in order to determine how they can be used in achieving efficient port 
pricing. The background of the port management of South Africa and its effect on port 
pricing will be analysed. This will be followed by an empirical analysis of price elasticity of 
demand for port services. An investigation of the currently applied port pricing model will be 
conducted through an analysis of each component of the model. The paper concludes by 
exploring an alternative pricing method that may be used to achieve efficient results. 
 
1.1. South African port pricing background 
Pricing by ports and operators within ports is historically determined (Meersman et al., 2002). 
South African port pricing history has shaped how pricing is conducted to date. In the period 
from 1833 to 1908 there was an era referred to as the pre-Union period, where all the ports 
were operating and managed independently of each other as specified by the associated 
colonial railways. Each port determined and administered its tariff rates and generated its 
own revenue. With each port authority operating exclusively, competition was high as each 
port wanted to attract as much throughput as possible (Chasomeris, 2002). 
 
In 1909 the South African Railways and Harbours (SAR&H) was formed and was in 
operation until 1981. The formation of SAR&H saw all ports being combined into one 
administration and management. The SAR&H also included railways and a uniform tariff 
structure mechanism was introduced. The uniform tariff structure called to the end the 
competitive environment that had once operated in the national ports system. The SAR&H 
undertook to run its operations according to business principles producing sufficient revenues 
and provided preferential  cheaper rates to agricultural and industrial sectors. With the pooled 
ports revenues, each port revenue contribution was not to be easily identifiable. The Harbours 
and railways were separated in 1911. With this mechanism, the revenues generated through 
cargo handling activities like stevedoring and warehousing fell into the railway revenue 
stream, with wharfage charges being split into two thirds for the ports and one third allocated 
to the railway stream (Chasomeris, 2002). 
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Through the South African Transport Services Act of 1981, the SAR&H was converted into 
South African Transport Services (SATS). SATS was formed as a state-owned business 
enterprise. This bought changes to the pricing policy within the ports system. The previous 
incentivizing of the agricultural and industrial sector that was introduced during the SAR&H 
era was done away with; with SATS advocating to developing a transport system that would 
serve favourably to the all national economic interests. SATS did however inherit the uniform 
port pricing mechanism across all ports and this lead to cross inter-port subsidization.  SATS 
separated the cargo handling operations away from the railway related business and placed 
them on the port related business.  
 
In 1989 things changed with the introduction of Transnet (Pty) Ltd. Transnet is a public 
company that is wholly government owned and prior to 2002, it operated in many transport 
sectors including the ports divisions (Portnet), rail division (Spoornet), commuter rail 
division (metro rail), pipelines division (Petronet), airways division (South African Airways) 
and several other businesses. Portnet was a division of Transnet that administered the port 
functions. Portnet administered its ports on a national level setting uniform tariff structure 
and competition amongst ports still did not exist. The era also inherited the uniform pricing 
mechanism across all national ports (NEDLAC, 2007). 
 
The national port transport system has been profoundly shaped by the wharfage that was 
introduced in 1925. Wharfage is charged in order to gain revenues that are used to pay for 
landside equipment and infrastructure (UNCTAD, 1995). The wharfage charge has been 
carried through into the current pricing system through cargo dues.  Wharfage is a category of 
general tariffs levied by port authorities on a unit basis (for example per ton, cubic meter, or 
per TEU). The wharfage was levied on ad valorem basis at a fixed rate based on the value of 
cargo declared on the manifest. The port authority also justified that the ad valorem charges 
would be at par with changes in prices and exchange rate fluctuations, which will save the 
authority from continuously changing the tariff rates. Through this pricing mechanism, low 
valued exports were kept at competitive levels. The authority also specified that the wharfage 
ensured that the ability to pay of cargo owners was realized. The wharfage was said to be 
discriminatory as it favoured low valued cargoes. This violated both the cost based and equity 
based pricing mechanisms. Suggestions of changing the wharfage were being rejected on the 
basis that low valued cargo would have to pay more, and export competitiveness would have 
been disadvantaged. The port authority was able to charge the value based prices as there was 
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no competition in between ports. During the wharfage pricing regime, Portnet was a major 
source of revenue for Transnet. The gains were divided amongst all Transnet divisions which 
lead to cross subsidization in between transport modes (Chasomeris, 2002). 
 
In the wharfage pricing mechanism, cargo functions subsidized marine functions which lead 
to ship owners to underpay on the services they utilized whilst on the other hand cargo 
owners overpaid. The White Paper on National transport policy came with the change to the 
structure of the Portnet as a division of Transnet.  The restructuring resulted into two port 
related divisions within the national transport system; the port authority called the National 
Ports Authority (NPA) and port operations division named the South African Port Operations  
(SAPO). The national port authority was to control and coordinate the port infrastructure and 
the terminals were to be leased to interested participants, including SAPO. SAPO on the other 
hand is the division that took over the cargo handling function and controlled all the 
terminals. Complementary tariff structure was the order of the day (NEDLAC, 2007).  
 
NPA was later changed and named Transnet National Ports Authority (TNPA) and SAPO 
named Transnet Port Terminals (TPT). All ports in South Africa are administered at national 
level by TNPA. The main objective of the authority is to own, manage, control and 
administer the port in order to guarantee that the ports are functioning in an efficient and 
economic manner. In achieving this objective, the authority provides, plans, maintain and 
develop infrastructure in the ports. The authority also needs to ensure that adequate, 
affordable and efficient port services and services are provided. The Authority employs a 
uniform pricing method across all ports therefore there is no price competition between the 
ports. 
 
In 2002, a tariff reform exercise was performed and resulted in ad valorem charges to be 
replaced by cargo dues. The tariff has not been reviewed since and there is currently a 
proposal which is being considered by the Ports Regulator in an effort to review the tariff 
method. The tariff revision is based on proposing the revenue requirement model to be 
adopted as a pricing model for the port charges, this will be discussed later. The Ports 
Regulator was introduced through the National Ports Act 12 of 2005. The office of the Ports 
Regulator came into effect in May 2007 and the key functions of the Ports Regulator include 
economic regulation of national ports in order to achieve government strategic objectives, 
promotion of equity access to the national ports and to monitor the port authority in order to 
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guarantee that the port authority performs its functions as outlined in the National Ports Act 
(Chasomeris, 2002). 
 
Since 2007, when the Port regulator was formulated the port authority is required to submit 
proposals of any tariff changes for the approval of the Ports Regulator. After receiving the 
application or proposal for tariff changes, the Ports Regulator then calls stakeholders of the 
ports system to make submissions and comments on the port authority proposed port tariff 
application (Chasomeris, 2011). The Ports Regulator then assesses the proposal of TNPA and 
submissions from the stakeholders and applies the National Ports Act 12 of 2005, National 
Commercial Port Policy of 2002 and the Ports Regulator Directives of 2008 in order to make 
a decision on the port tariff application. The Directives of the Ports Regulator set out that the 
Regulator should ensure that port authority recovers its investments; recover its costs of 
operations and attain a sufficient return to cover the opportunity of the capital employed in 
the production of its services. The tariffs are still uniform across all ports, port related 
investments are made by the national body with individual ports controlling their day-to-day 
operations.  
 
1.2. The functions of the port authority  
The port authority is responsible for the management of the national commercial port system 
as a landlord port authority. Being a landlord-type port authority, it owns all the port land in 
the country and manages the eight South African commercial ports, namely Saldanha Bay, 
Cape Town, Mossel Bay, East London, Port Elizabeth, Ngqura, Durban and Richards Bay. 
Each of the ports operates within a complementary port system to support a defined customer 
base as informed by its natural hinterland with defined markets which determines the nature 
of services and facilities and the types of cargo handled at each port. 
 
The service that the port authority provides is categorised into two groups, the basic port 
infrastructure and operational services to its users. According to the South African Ports Act, 
the revenue generated from the port authority services is to be used to maintain the already 
existing and provide future infrastructure and marine fleet. The South African ports system is 
self-funded and does not receive any financial assistance from the government.  The port 
infrastructure and maritime services provisions are categorised in five market segments, 
containers, dry bulk; liquid bulk, break-bulk and automotive.  
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It is desirable to have a port structure that is in line with cost structure of the port so that the 
infrastructure cost can be related to its revenue stream in order to facilitate comparisons 
between cost and revenue (UNCTAD, 1995). Table 1 below outlines the service provision 
and revenue streams of the port authority, there are five main revenue streams, TNPA 
receives revenue through the leasing of port land, provision of wet infrastructure, dry 
infrastructure, ship repair services and from marine service provision. 
Table 1: Port Authority port infrastructure and revenue system. 
Port Infrastructure Revenue Stream 
Port land 
 
Port land is leased to terminal 
operators and other port service 
and port facility providers in the 
port(s). 
Lease income (rentals) 
 
Wet infrastructure 
 
Lighthouse services infrastructure 
(lighthouses, buoys, beacons and 
electronic / radio navigation 
equipment) , port control and 
safety, entrance channels, 
breakwaters, turning basins, aids to 
navigation within port limits, 
vessel traffic services, maintenance 
dredging within ports. 
Light dues, port dues, vessel 
traffic services fees 
 
Dry infrastructure 
 
Quay walls, roads, rail lines, 
buildings, fencing, port security, 
lighting (outside terminals). 
Cargo dues, berth dues 
 
Ship repair services 
 
Provide and maintain repair 
facilities as well as the cranes 
utilised in such facilities. 
 
Preparation fee, docking and 
undocking fees (vessels at 
repair facilities), Berth dues 
(vessels at repair quays) 
Marine services 
 
Pilotage, tug assistance, berthing, 
running of lines, floating cranes 
 
Pilotage dues, tug assistance 
fees, berthing fees, running 
of line fees, floating crane 
hire fees 
Source: Transnet National Port Authority. 
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1.3. The objectives of the study 
This thesis serves to investigate methods of improving the port pricing to become more 
efficient. It provides an empirical analysis to investigating price elasticity of the ports 
services. This is because the more inelastic the demand is changes in prices would have 
significant welfare losses to the economy. The current port pricing methodology, revenue 
requirement model that TNPA applies will be examined. An alternate port pricing approach 
and its applicability to the South African ports system will be explored.  
 
1.4. Scope and limitations of the study 
TNPA receives revenue through the leasing of port land, provision of wet infrastructure, dry 
infrastructure, ship repair services and from marine service provision. The analysis of port 
pricing will apply to pricing for all the other services, except for port land provision revenue. 
The port land provision is priced based on individual contracts between the port landlord and 
its tenants and therefore does not form part of this thesis analysis.  
 
The initial thought of analysis was to explore alternative models that could be used to 
compare with the revenue requirement application to port pricing determination and a model 
with better results would be selected. This exercise proved difficult because other pricing 
models required information that was not available for this research; as an alternative the 
research focuses on developing an approach to port pricing for the South African port system. 
 
The study suggests changes to the revenue requirement that can be done to make the model 
serve to more efficient results but does not test these suggestions. This is because some of 
these suggestions require resources that were not available when the research was conducted. 
For example the valuation of the regulatory asset base and calculation is suggested to be 
revisited but this will require an appointment of qualified property valuators. The study also 
suggests a more disintegrated ports system structure with each port priced using assets of 
each port but the actual analysis of how beneficial this could not conducted because data that 
is available from the port authority is aggregated for all the ports into one figure. 
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1.5. Conclusion 
The history of the South African ports has a major impact on its current pricing practices as it 
resulted to high tariff levels for cargo dues resulting from the migration from the ad-valorem 
based wharfage charge, which depended on the value of the cargo. The need for pricing 
reform is required markets environment change, therefore in order to be competitive; ports 
need to make continuous improvements in terms of their service provision and optimal levels 
of their prices.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical and applied methods to port pricing by providing an in-
depth analysis on already existing literature on the subject. Chapter 3 provides the research 
methodology. Chapter 4 investigates the importance of an efficient port pricing method by 
analysing the price elasticity of demand for South African ports services and provides and 
analysis of its implications. It further explores the currently applied pricing model. Chapter 5 
investigates a pricing approach that would serve positively to the South African ports system. 
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion and recommendations for the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
Port pricing is one of the areas that several topics to port capacity, port competition, strategy, 
policy and regulation are attended to instantaneously. The right price for port services can 
lead to prosperity and growth of a port whilst the wrong price can lead a port to extinction or 
increase in inefficiency and use of subsidies. Ports that have some level of monopoly power 
are able to charge higher prices to customers without much reduction in demand but high port 
prices hurt the trade that the port is supposed to serve. Low port prices on the other hand may 
increase the number of clients that the port would have to service but congestions may be 
experienced and investment costs may not be recovered in the long run (Haralambides & 
Veenstra, 2002). Port pricing is therefore strongly influenced by the structure of the maritime 
industry and the bargaining powers of the industry participants.  
 
This chapter sets out to critically review the port pricing literature that is currently available 
in providing light for the subsequent chapters of this paper. The first section discusses the 
theoretic studies as provided by different schools of thought on the subject. This will be 
followed by an analysis of the practical port pricing behaviour recorded to date in the 
different ports of the world. The chapter will then conclude providing a summary of the 
findings and a way forward for the paper as informed by the observations. 
 
Port pricing policy recognises two basic approaches, the economic and the financial 
approach. The economic approach relates to port pricing based on marginal cost and also 
considers the effects and benefits the port provide to its users. The financial approach on the 
other hand is based on accounting costs that allows the port to recuperate the fixed and 
variable costs it incurs in providing the facilities and services and also gain adequate rate of 
return on its investments. Simply, a port using the financial approach seeks to achieve a profit 
and the port using economic approach serve to nurture local economic activities and 
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development. In 1975, UNCTAD published its report on port pricing which advocated for 
ports to give primary consideration to the economic costs rather than the accounting costs in 
setting port prices (UNCTAD, 1975).  
 
2.2. Economic pricing approach 
Port management reasonably focus on the responsibility of focusing in producing good 
financial results each year with limited appreciation of welfare economics. The importance of 
welfare economics in the pricing system is that it goes beyond accounting for private costs 
but also include social costs also (Goss & Stevens, 2001). 
 
Marginal cost pricing is supported because of its potential to increase economic welfare.  
Marginal cost is the change in total cost that arises with a unit change in the activity level. 
(Goss & Stevens, 2001) Ports have substantial fixed costs and marginal costs can be arguably 
low, therefore causing differing views surrounding the use of marginal cost pricing. Some 
authors argue that port prices should be based on short-run marginal costs. The short-term 
marginal cost pricing advocates that short-run marginal cost indicates the precise difference 
in costs between acceptance and refusal of the additional user. Also, short term marginal cost 
pricing sound plausible on economic allocation perspective but practically, it would make 
port charges vary strongly over time making port charges unpredictable. An alternative is the 
use of average short run costs. The average short run cost in certain conditions can be 
estimated by the long run marginal costs (Meersman et al., 2003). Haralambides et al., (2001) 
asserts that with assumption of certain conditions being made, long-run marginal cost pricing 
is the most efficient pricing method. 
 
Theoretically the use of marginal cost as a pricing method is sound but practical application 
is hard. Bennathan and Walters (1979) as cited from Meersman et al., (2003) qualify this 
argument to a certain extent by saying that setting port prices to be equal to marginal costs 
can only be best applied in a perfectly competitive and free economy or in an efficient 
socialist economy (Meersman et al., 2003). These kinds of economies hardly exist in the 
current economic environment.  A report issued by Academic Expert Group (AEG) to the 
European Commission argued that in ports, particularly those operating in a competitive 
environment, marginal cost pricing is not so straightforward whereas full cost recovery, in 
combination with the user pays principle, can form a workable basis for fair and efficient 
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pricing. (Haralambides H. , 2000) There is still no consensus on the issue and empirical 
research would serve to clear the issue and there is still research still being written on the 
matter. 
 
2.2. Financial pricing approach 
Port management using the financial pricing approach reasonably focus on the responsibility 
of concentrating in producing good financial results each year with limited appreciation of 
other objectives it can pursue. The main objective of a port using financial approach to port 
pricing is concerned with returns that it can get on its investment. There is not much literature 
on this approach to pricing. This could be because many researchers advocate that the 
economic approach, the implementation of marginal cost pricing is the main requirement 
towards efficient port pricing (Haralambides, Verbeke, Musso, & Bennachio, 2001). The port 
may also focus on wanting to achieve a certain objective and not explicitly refer to it as 
wanting to increase its financial returns. For example the port can advertise that it wants to 
increase throughput, whereas the end results that it actually wants is better returns on its 
investment. 
 
There is also a school of thought on the port pricing subject that suggest that the point of 
departure to port pricing management is to start from the heterogeneous nature of ports which 
incorporates all its market players and their possible conflicting objectives (Meersman, 
Vanelslander, & van de Voorde, 2003). For example ports want to maximise their 
throughput, realise return on their investment. The port user on the other hand wants quality 
service, quick turnaround and a transparent charging system.  
 
2.3. Strategic pricing 
Strategic port pricing is based on the premise that port charges are linked to the port strategic 
objectives. This simply means that pricing can be a very useful tool in achieving the 
objectives and targets of a strategic plan of a port. The principle of this model is that the 
cargo and users elasticity to demand of the port services is different with different prices. 
Strategic pricing plans are made up of specific strategies such as investment in facilities and 
equipment; improvements in operational efficiency, market-oriented pricing or promotion of 
the port or specific services. For example a port that has an objective of promoting economic 
development could be priced to favour exports over imports (Acciaro, 2013). Van Niekerk 
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(2004) also argues that specific objectives of the ports should ascertain the structure and level 
of the tariffs. 
 
 One of the important factors to port pricing is the degree of market power that the port has 
on its users. An analysis on the relationship between price level implementation and port 
model revealed that when an oligopoly model is applied, landlord ports yield the highest 
profit for the port authorities and highest price for the port users. This is partly because of the 
complementarity of the port authority and the port service providers where each ignores the 
effects of their mark-up on the port user. Ports operating in competitive environment however 
result in efficiency gains and substantially lower port charges (Meersman et al., 2003). The 
South African ports system is characterised as having some level monopolistic power as there 
is only one port authority. The degree of market power in such a ports system can lead to 
inefficiencies if not properly managed. 
 
Increasing competition in between ports and competition between modes of transport has led 
to other ports to maintain the traditional method of negotiating tariffs with shipping lines in 
accordance with service agreements based on for example the number of ship calls, loading 
and discharge volume, etc. In these instances marginal costs can be used as a ceiling or the 
floor price (Bichou, 2009). 
 
2.4. Port pricing in practice 
There is substantial theoretical work that has been developed around port pricing but there is 
limited empirical research available on the application of actual pricing strategies in 
individual or regional ports. Methodologically, most papers that have been written on port 
pricing utilise conceptual economic models and game theory. According to Acciaro the 
scarcity in empirical research on this topic is due to the confidential classification of pricing 
information by ports and also due to difficulty of obtaining reliable port data (Acciaro, 2013). 
Furthermore, in some cases port charges and data are confidential and difficult to obtain. It is 
therefore worth noting that there are significant research opportunities on the topic. On the 
few studies available, the port charges structure is analysed but there is no information on 
how each port determines its price level.  The report from the Economic and Social 
Commission of Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) region outlines that the model tariff structure 
was developed and shared to provide a common framework for the presentation of port 
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prices. However, the task of actually determining prices within the structure was left to the 
decision of individual ports. Information on how each of these countries and ports do the 
determination process is not publicly available (ESCAP, 2002).  
In Europe, port pricing has attracted a substantial amount of research studies in order to 
explore an application of harmonised approach to the substantial differences in the funding 
and pricing methods being employed; because the varied legal, cultural, port management 
style traditions (Meersman et al., 2003). For South Africa, as highlighted in the previous 
chapter there has been some amount of changes in the methodology of port pricing in the 
years which have been based on the governance and management structure of the port 
system. There is however no publicly available record of the determination process of such 
methodologies prior to 2009. Since 2009, when the ports regulator started operation, the tariff 
determination process is publicly available and public participation is required in the process. 
Chasomeris (2002) highlighted that South Africa has substantial challenges in addressing 
terms of improving overall port performance and port pricing; and the areas that still require 
attention include the limited level of competition in the ports and the inefficient pricing 
system (Chasomeris, 2002). 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
It is generally accepted to port managers and those who fund ports that port price should be 
cost-related, although there is no clear guideline on which cost base should be used; that 
prices should allow for cost recovery and should also meet certain objectives that are specific 
to a port under discussion. It is clear though that any port pricing system and price 
determination process should have a clear relationship between port facilities and users. It 
should also be kept in mind that the price a port user has to pay is his cost, which will in turn 
determine his own pricing behaviour (Meersman et al., 2003). The best port pricing approach 
would incorporate the heterogeneous nature of ports because of the diversity in terms 
structure, scope and type of operations; and taking into account the different market players, 
with different possibly conflicting interests and objectives. There is limited information to 
provide answers on the overarching question of whether, and how, an efficient pricing system 
can be implemented in practice in the port sector. There is also no visible attention on 
developing the strategic port pricing approach into application in port pricing models.  
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The next chapters set to investigates port pricing development of the South African ports 
system. The methodology to analysing the objectives of the study is discussed in the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This study uses both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies. As it tools, it uses 
secondary data analysis and also a regression analysis. Secondary data analysis will involve 
an analysis of an existing dataset regarding port pricing in South Africa collected from 
various sources which include the Transnet National Ports Authority, the Ports Regulator of 
South Africa and other industry bodies and will also include book and journal articles. 
Regression is the process of describing and evaluating the relationship between given 
variable and one or more other variables. It is basically an effort to describe movements in 
one variable with reference to movements of the other variable (Brooks, 2008). The 
regression analysis is to be conducted using the classical linear regression model (CLRM) 
using EViews statistical software.     
 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to test the responsiveness of the port users to the price 
changes therefore highlighting how future price changes can influence the South African 
transport system and economic growth. The model to test this relationship is outlined below. 
The focus will then shift to the current port pricing system and secondary sources will be 
used for this analysis. The alternative pricing approach suggestion will be explored using 
secondary data sources. 
 
The responsiveness of the port users to the price changes is to be analysed using the price 
elasticity of demand theory. Price elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in 
quantity demanded with respect to a one percent change in the price. Price elasticity therefore 
measures the responsiveness of quantity demanded to changes in price. Price elasticity 
greater than one is termed price elastic. Price elasticity of one is called unit elastic and price 
elasticity less than one is called price inelastic. For a price elastic commodity, small 
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increments in price cause a significant change in volume while a price inelastic commodity, 
changes in price affect volume movements marginally (Mankiw, 2011). Price elasticity is 
given by the following formula: 
  
   
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
    (1) 
Where: ϵ is the price elasticity, P is the price, and Q is the quantity 
 
3.2. Data  
The data used in this research thesis is obtained from the TNPA website (TNPA, 2014). The 
data is for all the South African ports. There are five main commodities that are transported 
through South African ports, dry bulk, liquid bulk, break-bulk, automobiles and containers. 
Data was only available for the dry bulk, break-bulk and container cargo therefore the 
analysis is going to focus on these three cargo types. The study will consider imports and 
exports of the three cargo types separately. The period of analysis is from December 2007 to 
June 2014. Two variables are to be considered for each commodity group, the volume and the 
cargo dues charged on the commodities passing through the ports. The data contains the 
volume of traffic of the import and export commodities, measured in metric tons. It also 
includes the price levied as cargo dues on the commodities all ports per ton in the case of dry 
bulk and break-bulk and per container for containerised commodities. Monthly intervals of 
data were used.  
 
Cargo dues only change in April annually, therefore annual data observations could be done 
to capture the annual changes but the data for the cargo dues prices prior to December 2007 
could not be sourced. Therefore using annual data could yield too few observations for any 
sound analysis. Since the analysis will be to test volume changes against changes in port 
charges, it seemed appropriate to use cargo dues as a port price indicator. Using vessel related 
analysis would have proved unrealistic as some vessels do not call into port for cargo related 
activities but may call for bunkers or repairs and these are not differentiated on the ports 
authority statistical portal. Price elasticity for volumes of cargo throughput can be affected by 
various other factors other than port charges including economic climate, trade policies, the 
weather. For the purposes of this study, all other factors are assumed to be constant. 
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3.3. Model and variables 
The classical linear regression model (CLRM) is to be used to conduct the analysis. The 
CRLM explains the value of a dependent variable (Q) in terms of a set of explanatory 
variable (P) in and an unobservable random variable (ε):  
                
Five assumptions are made for the CLRM in order to show that the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation technique has the appropriate properties and for the hypothesis tests of the 
coefficient estimates to be validly be conducted will be tested below. The first assumption is 
that the average of the errors is zero. Including an intercept (α) in a regression equation 
ensures that this assumption is not violated. The second assumption is that the variance of 
errors (ε) is constant. This assumption is called homoscedasticity. The third assumption is 
that the CLRM the covariance between disturbance terms over time is zero. Simply, it is 
assumed that the error terms are not correlated with each other, known as autocorrelation. 
The fourth assumption is that the independent variables are non-stochastic. Each regression 
equation to be estimated it to contain only one explanatory variable therefore there is no need 
to conduct a test on this assumption. The fifth assumption is that the disturbance errors are 
normally distributed. Log-returns of the volume variables and price variables were used in 
order to estimate the equations using EViews statistic software. The regression equation is 
presented as by follows: 
lnQ = α + β·lnP  + ε 
where: Q and P are defined as before, a and b are parameters to be estimated using the regression. 
 
The stationarity of a series can influence the properties leading to false regressions. If the 
variables of the regression are not stationary then the standard assumptions of asymptotic 
analysis will not be valid, meaning that the “t-ratios” will not follow a t-distribution. The unit 
root test was used to test the following null hypothesis (H0) that the series contains a unit root 
against the alternative (H1) that the series is stationary (Brooks, 2008). 
 
The twelve variables were tested for stationarity and table 3 below presents the results. It 
shows that the break-bulk imports variable is stationery. The break-bulk exports, bulk 
imports, bulk exports, container imports and container exports variables are also stationary. 
The break-bulk imports cargo dues variable contains a unit root and is therefore not 
(2) 
(3) 
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stationery. The break-bulk exports cargo dues variable, bulk imports cargo dues, container 
imports cargo dues variable, and container exports variables are not stationary. Variables that 
contained a unit root were converted to first difference and the container exports cargo dues 
and container exports cargo dues variable became stationary. The four remaining four 
variables had to be converted into second difference to become stationary. 
 
Table 2: Stationarity Test Results. 
Variable Augmented Dickey-Fuller test Probability 
Break Bulk Imports Test statistic: - 6.498062 
Critical values:  
1% level:  - 4.080021 
5% level: - 3.468459 
10% level:              - 3.161067 
0.000 
Break Bulk Exports test statistic: - 5.601081 
Critical values:  
1% level:  -4.080021 
5% level: -3.468459 
10% level:              -3.161067 
0.001 
Bulk Imports test statistic: - 6.902930 
Test critical values:  
1% level: -4.081666 
5% level: -3.469235 
10% level: -3.161518 
0.000 
Bulk Exports Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic: - 
8.198245 
Test critical values:  
1% level: -4.080021 
5% level: -3.468459 
10% level: -3.161067 
0.000 
Container Imports Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic: - 
6.510490 
Test critical values:  
1% level: -4.080021 
5% level: -3.468459 
10% level: -3.161067 
0.000 
Container Exports Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic: - 
14.75621 
Test critical values:  
1% level: -4.080021 
5% level: -3.468459 
10% level: -3.161067 
0.001 
Break Bulk Imports Cargo Dues Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic: - 
2.940165 
Test critical values:  
1% level: -4.080021 
5% level: -3.468459 
10% level: -3.161067 
0.1560 
Break Bulk Exports Cargo Dues Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic: - 
2.939441 
Test critical values:  
1% level: -4.080021 
5% level: -3.468459 
10% level: -3.161067 
0.1562 
Bulk Imports Cargo Dues Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic: - 0.1490 
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2.964029 
Test critical values 
1% level: -4.080021 
5% level: -3.468459 
10% level: -3.161067 
Bulk Exports Cargo Dues Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic: - 
2.940740 
Test critical values: 
1% level: -4.080021 
5% level: -3.468459 
10% level: -3.161067 
0.1558 
Container Imports Cargo Dues Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic: - 
1.786169 
Test critical values:  
1% level: -4.080021 
5% level: -3.468459 
10% level: -3.161067 
0.7021 
Container Exports Cargo Dues Test statistic: - 1.589837 
Test critical values:  
1% level: -4.080021 
5% level: -3.468459 
10% level: -3.161067 
0.7882 
 
After the stationary test and variables were corrected for stationarity, a regression with the 
volume of each cargo group being the dependent variable and the cargo dues charge as the 
independent variable was conducted and the results are presented in table 3 below. The 
regression probability shows that there is no correlation between break-bulk imports and 
break-bulk cargo dues at all levels of significance. The t-statistic and probability 
computations also show that there is no statistically significant relationship between break-
bulk exports and break-bulk export cargo dues. There is also no significant relationship 
between bulk volumes, both imports and exports with their respective cargo dues. Container 
exports and imports have no significant relationship with their respective cargo dues. 
Diagnostic tests are then conducted to test the five assumptions of the CLRM. 
 
Table 3: First Regression Coefficient Results 
 α β R-Squared 
Break-Bulk Imports 12.86817 
(295.2047) 
{0.0000} 
 
-1.846682 
(-0.921538) 
{ 0.3597} 
0.011196 
Break-Bulk Exports 13.47953 
(403.0734) 
{0.0000} 
 
0.971058 
(0.631646)  
{0.4878} 
0.005292 
Bulk Imports 15.11168 
(701.5879) 
{0.0000} 
 
0.690839  
(0.697313) 
{0.4537} 
0.006442 
Bulk Exports 16.26623 0.608912 0.011102 
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(1127.545) 
{0.0000} 
 
(0.917604) 
{0.3618} 
Container Imports 12.05829 
(781.7480) 
{0.0000} 
 
-1.002398 
(-1.508505) 
{0.1356} 
0.029071 
Container Exports 12.04692 
(767.2300) 
{0.0000} 
 
-0.369867 
(-1.550977) 
{0.1251} 
0.030681 
Key:  ()  - T-Statistic {} – Probability 
 
Table 4 shows the results of diagnostic tests. The White test was used to examine whether the 
regression equations were homoscedastic. The F-statistic and Chi-squared statistics shows 
that all the regression are homoscedastic. The autocorrelation was tested using the Breusch-
Godfrey test; only the regression for break-bulk imports had no autocorrelation. The Newey-
West approach was used to correct the autocorrelation in the regression residuals. The Jarque-
Bera normality test was conducted. The results show that the residuals are normally 
distributed. 
 
The Ramsey RESET test was conducted to examine whether the relationship of the 
dependent variable in each equation and the explanatory variables is linear or not. The 
linearity results are presented in table 4. In all the regressions, the t-statistic and F-statistic 
indicate that the variables have a linear relationship with each other. 
 
Table 4: Regression Diagnostic Tests. 
 Homoscedasticity Autocorrelation Normality Linearity 
Bulk Imports (0.4673) 
{0.4607} 
(0.0000) 
{0.0000} 
(12.90235) 
{0.001579} 
0.5887 
 
Bulk Exports (0.3608) 
{0.3543} 
(0.0012) 
{0.0016} 
(84.06894) 
{0.000000} 
0.6975 
 
Break Bulk 
Imports 
(0.3261) 
{0.3197} 
(0.3762) 
{0.3615} 
(4.856533) 
{0.088190} 
0.4891 
Break Bulk 
Exports 
(0.6101) 
{0.6044} 
(0.0000) 
{0.0000} 
(3.306262) 
{0.191450} 
0.4877 
Container 
Imports 
(0.5003) 
{0.4939} 
(0.0000) 
{0.0000} 
(3.606717) 
{0.164745} 
0.7167 
 
Container 
Exports 
(0.5839) 
{0.5781} 
(0.0001) 
{0.0001} 
(10.31171) 
{0.057660} 
0.3559 
  
Key () F- Statistic 
{} Chi-squared 
statistic 
() : F- Prob.  
{} Chi-Square 
Prob. 
() – Jarque-Bera 
{} - Probability 
t-statistic 
and 
F-statistic 
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After all the diagnosis tests were conducted and all the assumptions of the CLRM were 
fulfilled. The results of the regressions are presented in table 5. There is no significant 
relationship between break-bulk imports and break-bulk cargo dues. There is no correlation 
between break-bulk exports and its cargo dues. There is also no significant relationship 
between bulk imports and bulk import cargo dues. The bulk exports volume changes and bulk 
exports cargo dues do not have a statistically significant relationship. Container exports have 
a significant negative relationship with container exports cargo dues. Container exports are 
negatively correlated to container cargo dues. 
 
Table 5: Regression results after correction from diagnosis tests. 
 α β R-Squared 
Break-Bulk Imports 12.86817 
172.9699 
0.0000 
 
-1.846682 
-1.347538 
0.1819 
0.011196 
Break-Bulk Exports 13.47953 
297.2035 
0.0000 
0.971058 
1.155593 
0.2515 
0.005292 
Bulk Imports 15.11168 
(701.5879) 
{0.0000} 
0.690839  
(0.697313) 
{0.4537} 
0.006442 
Bulk Exports 16.26623 
1127.545 
0.0000 
0.608912 
0.917604 
0.3618 
0.011102 
Container Imports 12.05829 
503.6639 
0.0000 
-1.002398 
-2.120072 
0.0373 
0.029071 
Container Exports 12.04692 
516.7375 
0.0000 
-0.369867 
-4.139269 
0.0001 
0.030681 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter presented the tools to be used in answering the main objectives of this research 
paper. Secondary data sources analysis and regression results to answer the objectives of the 
thesis. The model for calculating the elasticity of demand for port services was presented and 
tests were conducted to ensure that the results that will be obtained are statistically sound. 
The results of the regression estimates show relatively low R-squared, this is because of the 
decision to include only one explanatory variable to be analysed, this was due to data 
constrains. The results of the CLRM are going to be used to form an analysis of the 
responsiveness of the trade volumes passing through the ports to pricing methods of the port. 
Port price sensitivity of volumes can serve as a basis for the ports authority to devise port 
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prices that are differentiated according to commodity type and trade direction given their 
relative sensitivity.  
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Chapter 4: Research Analysis  
4.1. Introduction 
It is industry accepted that efficient port prices should be implemented. Devising a method of 
attaining these efficient price levels is left to each one to figure out because there is no one 
solution to this determination. The method used to price port services depends on many 
factors; these include the sources of funding, the structure and management of the port, 
regulation and the elasticity of demand for port services (Haralambides & Veenstra, 2002). 
This section serves to investigate how the South African ports system uses and can use its 
elements in attaining efficient port prices. The first section will discuss the elasticity of 
demand for port services by analysing the results of estimation of the CLRM. This will be 
followed by an analysis of the method employed by the port management under the guidance 
of the ports regulator in determining the port price levels. 
 
4.2. The price elasticity of demand for port services 
The South African ports transport a wide range of commodities and the main cargo types are 
dry bulk, liquid bulk, break-bulk, automobiles and containers. The analysis only focuses on 
the dry bulk, break-bulk and containers as data to conduct analysis for the automobiles and 
liquid bulk could not be sourced. The hypothesis is that South African trade volumes through 
the ports are price inelastic. The hypothesis is based on the notion that the degree of price 
elasticity of demand is determined by the availability of alternatives or substitutes and 
whether the good is a luxury or a need. There is a limitation in substitute port service being 
available as all commercial ports on the South African coastline are owned and controlled by 
the same port authority. Neighbouring country ports are far from the industrial centres that 
would benefit from having alternative port service. Secondly, trade needs the maritime 
transport service because of the economies of scale that this transport mode provides in 
comparison to other transport modes. The geographical location of South Africa in relation to 
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its trading partners also supports the use of maritime transport in relation to other modes. This 
therefore leads to the belief that port users do not change their trading behaviour in relation to 
port price changes.  
 
The CLRM results revealed that, other things remaining constant there is no significant 
relationship between dry bulk import and exports passing through the port with port charges. 
It also revealed that there is no statistically significant relationship between break-bulk 
imports and exports with their respective port prices, other things remaining constant. 
Container exports and container imports have a significant negative relationship with port 
prices, ceteris paribus. A 1% increase in container imports cargo dues will lead to a 1% 
decrease in import containers (as shown in table 5), other things remaining the same.  The 
estimated elasticity is slightly above 1 in absolute value, therefore if can be inferred that 
demand for container imports is relatively unit elastic. An increase of 1% of cargo dues will 
lead to a 0.37% reduction in container export volumes, other things being equal. The 
elasticity for container exports is less than 1 therefore container exports are price inelastic. 
The findings are contrary to Suykens and Van de Voorde (1998) who argue that the overall 
demand for port services is inelastic but port specific demand elasticity is high (Meersman et 
al., 2002). Haralambides (2002) revealed that in Europe there is high sensitivity of demand 
for port services to changes in prices. For example, the study measured how much change in 
container volumes would result if the dredging costs were to be recovered from user charges 
for the port of Hamburg. It was discovered that a price increase of 10 Euros (about 5%) to its 
terminal handling charges per TEU would lead to a 15.3% (about half a million TEU) 
reduction in container traffic (Haralambides, 2002) The overall effect of increases in port 
prices leads to loss in consumer surplus and to some extent can be passed on to society 
consumers. This is because of roll-on effects that increases in port prices could have to the 
logistics supply chains and to the final consumer. The difference in these results may be 
because of the difference in competition levels between these two regions. Europe is 
characterised with port price changes forming a major consideration to port management in 
making decisions for its customers. Ports that are leaders in pricing and performance 
measures around the world are located in regions characterised by a high degree of port 
competition (NEDLAC, 2007). 
 
In order to protect the interest of the port users with demand elasticity as shown for 
containers can be gained through competition or regulation. South Africa has very limited 
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exposure to port competition; this includes both intra-port and inter-port competition. Inter-
port completion refers to competition between ports and intra-port completion refers to 
completion between terminals or service providers within the same port. Inter-port 
competition is constrained because TNPA is the only legally recognised port owner and 
employs a complementary system in terms types of cargo being handled by each port. 
Regulation, through the introduction of the office of the ports regulator can only provide 
relief based on market and academic research which does have limitations but a change in 
competition structure can yield more efficient results. 
 
The non-significance of the relationship between dry bulk and break bulk cargo to changes in 
port price, and also the low R-squared value given by the models is an indication that there 
are other significant factors that drive the demand for goods passing through the ports. As a 
trade facilitator ports should ensure that it does not create trade barriers. 
 
4.3. Port pricing determination 
In order for the port authority to make changes to the port charges the port authority must 
submit its proposal for changes to the ports regulator for approval. The port authority uses the 
required revenue method to motivate its application for the tariff changes. The ports authority 
filed its first tariff application in September 2009 for the implementation from financial year 
2010/2011. The financial year of the ports authority starts on 1 April and ends 31 March 
(TNPA, 2009). Five tariff applications have been made to date.  Since the tariff determination 
process was introduced there have been significant differences between what the ports 
authority proposes and what gets granted by the Ports Regulator.  This chapter examines the 
benefits and limitations of currently applied revenue requirement model by investigating each 
of the model elements. 
 
Table 3 shows the port authority tariff changes proposals and the actual increases allowed by 
the ports regulator for all the financial years to date. In the 2010/2011 financial year the 
TNPA requested a 10.62% increase but the ports regulator approved only 4.42%, which is 
less than even half the percentage increase requested. In financial year 2011/2012 an 11.91% 
increase was proposed but only 4.49% was allowed which is still a significant variance. In the 
financial year 2012/2013 an 18.06% increase was requested, but the ports regulator approved 
a 2.76% increase. In the financial year 2013/2014 a 5.4 % increment was tabled to the 
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regulator, but for the first time, a reduction in cargo dues was given as ruling by the ports 
regulator, with reductions of up to 43.2% for container exports. This was a substantial 
development because it also indicated that when the proposal was reviewed the ports 
regulator took time to also consider commodity related implication to the port pricing. In the 
financial year 2014/2015 the ports authority requested a 14.39 increase but 5.95 was 
approved for all cargo dues and an 8.15% increase for some bulk cargo commodities and 
marine services. The variance of the proposed increases and the allowed is because of the 
contradictory treatments application of the revenue requirement components.  
 
Table 6: The TNPA proposed port tariff and Ports Regulator. 
Year Proposed Tariff 
change by the Ports 
Authority 
Actual Tariff Change Allowed by 
the Ports Regulator 
Financial year 2010/2011 10.62% increase 4.42% increase 
Financial year 2011/2012 11.91% increase 4.49% increase 
Financial year 2012/2013 18.06% increase 2.76% increase 
Financial year 2013/2014 5.4% increase Cargo dues tariffs  
reduction as follows: 
Container exports - reduced by 43.2%; 
Container import cargo - reduced by 
14.3%  
Motor vehicles (Ro-Ro)export -
reduced by 21.1%  
The remainder of the tariffs in the 
tariff book retained at the same level as 
for the 2012/2013 tariff year 
Financial year 2014/2015 14.39% increase All cargo dues to increase by 5.9% 
expect: 
 8.15% tariff increase in Dry Bulk 
Cargo Dues for Coal, Iron Ore and 
Manganese 
 8.15 % tariff increase on all Marine 
Services and related tariffs  
 
Source: Author compiled using data from Transnet National Ports Authority Tariff applications 2010 -2015 and 
the Ports Regulator of South Africa Record of Decision 2010 – 2015. 
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The revenue requirement is then converted into tariffs, which are presented in the form of a 
detailed tariff book in the format as outlined in table 8 as will be discussed later. 
 
5.2. Revenue Requirement 
The revenue requirement is estimated using the following formula (TNPA, 2013b): 
Revenue Requirement = Regulatory Asset Base (“RAB”) x Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital (WACC) + Operating cost + Depreciation + Taxation Expense – (+) Claw Back + (-) 
Excessive Tariff Increase Margin Credit (ETIMC) 
 
4.3.1. Regulatory Asset Base (“RAB”) 
The Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) reflects the total value of the assets of TNPA.  This is the 
most important element as it accounts for 55% of the revenue requirement (TNPA, 2012a). 
The main components of RAB are fixed assets, capital work-in-progress and the working 
capital. Fixed assets are made up of the real estate business assets which are rented out to 
external operators for limited period use and marine business assets. Capital work-in-progress 
consists of assets that are not yet used for users’ benefits. The last element of the RAB, 
working capital, consists of inventories that are used to maintain port facilities; plus trade 
receivables and operating cash; less trade payables which include operating costs and capital 
expenditure (CAPEX). 
 
There are many methods available for valuing assets and are used in different ways to fulfil 
certain objectives and circumstances. According to Foster and Antmann (2004) it is not 
unusual to find about 2:1 variances in between asset valuation methodologies. This suggests 
that a substantial amount of skill needs to be employed in deciding on the valuation method 
given the impact that it has on the overall tariff.   There are two main approaches to 
evaluating assets, the economic value approach and replacement cost based approach. The 
economic value approach determines the asset value based on its capacity to generate cash. 
The replacement cost based approach refers to the value of the asset in relation to the cost of 
buying the asset at its historic cost or at a cost that is adjusted to price changes that have 
materialised to the lifetime of the asset. It can also include the effects of inflation, 
depreciation and changes in technology (Foster & Antmann, 2004). TNPA uses the 
Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost (DORC) which is founded on replacement cost 
approach (TNPA, 2013a). The DORC individually calculates the cost of asset replacement 
(4) 
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based on the age of the asset and the established depreciation schedule of the asset. The way 
TNPA applies the DORC method needs to be revisited because some of the assets were 
inherited by TNPA at low or no cost at all from the government but the authority charges its 
users full market value of these assets, whereas only the costs of maintenance and operation 
should be considered (MOGS, 2013).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, TNPA is part of the freight group Transnet Ltd. consisting of the 
container terminals operator, Transnet Port Terminals (TPT) and rail service provider, 
Transnet Freight Rail (TFR). The ports authority is consequently a landlord to its sister 
company which sometimes affords TPT and TFR special treatment than other operators. 
Some assets within the port precinct that belong to the TFR and TPT have been included in 
the asset base. An example of this is the inclusion of the Durban Bayhead shunting yard 
which is exclusively utilised by TFR and is calculated on the ports authority asset base. TFR 
also does not pay any rent towards utilising this facility because the ports authority argues 
that as a landlord it should provide access to its facilities (NPCC, 2013). This would hold if 
this was public access but it is being exclusively used by one operator and the user pays 
principle is dishonoured as all the port users have to pay for these assets.  
 
The main drawback with the inclusion of the work-in-progress capital in the regulatory asset 
base is that the user does not derive benefit from the incomplete facilities, therefore violating 
the main requirements of the “user-pays principle” that the pricing system is based on. TNPA 
selects to include work-in-progress in the RAB value at the value that they possess during the 
pricing calculations in order to avoid significant increases in RAB that would result if the 
assets are bought in once commissioned. TNPA also argues that construction can take from 
24 to 36 months to build tying-in capital and port facilities (TNPA, 2012a). In the formula, 
there is provision to accommodate momentous revenue requirement increases through the 
Excessive Tariff Increase Margin Credit (ETIMC) there is no reason to include work-in-
progress capital to avoid significant increases. Practically also, the work-in-progress would 
not really reflect its true value as for example it takes about 6 months for the tariff 
determination process for each year to be conducted, the value of the work-in-progress could 
have changed dramatically in that time period although this would make no difference to the 
user as he would still be not deriving benefits from these assets. The work-in-progress assets 
should be included on the RAB once these assets have been commissioned. 
 
 29 
 
The work-in-progress capital inclusion may have significant price consequences for the port 
user. An example of this would be when the ports authority purchased land that would be 
developed into a port, the acquisition of the Durban International Airport site. This caused an 
increment to the RAB by 1, 8 billion rands (about $1, 8 million) which had an impact in the 
percentage increase proposed by the ports authority (TNPA, 2012c). The Ports Regulator 
however ruled that this amount should not form part of the asset base calculation as no port 
user would be deriving any benefit from the purchase until it has become an actual port (Ports 
Regulator of South Africa, 2013).The user pays principle is also violated by the inclusion and 
calculation of assets (RAB) of all the ports into one. This means that asset base upgrades that 
are done in one port are paid by all the port users who may have benefited from the upgrade 
or not.  
 
CAPEX is calculated based on forecasts calculations of the trade volume growth. The main 
commodities that are handled by the South African ports are coal, iron ore, containers, 
automotive, steel, fruit, ferrochrome, petroleum products and manganese. Trade volumes of 
these commodities are not only affected by the domestic economic climate but are also 
threatened by the global economic challenges. The port authority gathers cargo volume and 
vessel forecasts primarily from terminal operators and shipping lines and these are used for 
the ports authority future revenue expectations (TNPA, 2013a). Since the applications to 
review are done in August, it may be helpful to consider the actual volumes that the ports 
authority is handling for that particular year as it will provide a more realist picture than just 
budgeted or envisaged volumes because the trading environment changes. The capital 
expenditure projections should also include analysis information regarding the impact that 
each project will have on throughput, efficiency performance and future investment patterns. 
 
4.3.2. Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
The cost of capital reflects the return that the port authority must gain in order to compensate 
the investors on the risk that they take in employing their funds on the business (TNPA, 
2012a). WACC incorporates all sources of funding and also takes into account the gearing of 
debt and equity within the organisation. The vanilla WACC is used and is calculated using 
the following formula: 
WACC = Ke (1- g) + kd*g (5) 
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Where: Ke – post-tax cost of equity; kd - TNPA estimated pre-tax cost of debt; g- TNPA 
gearing 
A post-tax cost of equity and pre-tax cost of debt is observed in WACC calculation. Since 
debt is a tax deductible expense and equity is taxable, an allowance, through an addition of 
tax expense to the revenue requirement equation needs to be made (discussed in 4.3.4 below).  
Ke – (Cost of Equity) = Rf (Risk free rate) + β * MRP (market risk premium)  
The cost of equity is calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which is 
given by the tax-free risk-free rate; plus the product of Beta (β) and the market risk premium 
(MRP).  The South African Reserve Bank (“SARB”) bonds with over 10 years maturities are 
used for the risk-free rate. By default, the MRP is a forward-looking concept and cannot be 
observed but should be estimated by analysing excess returns on the market over a long 
period interval. There are two approaches used to estimate MRP, the theoretical or 
prospective approach which both have their own limitations. The historical approach 
compares the historical returns on equities with returns on risk free assets government bonds 
and Treasury bills. It based on actual data which is plausible but the main drawback is that 
economic conditions, inflation, interest rates and market trends change over time and may 
lend the historical estimates inappropriate. MRP is sensitive to the choice of measurement 
period, the averaging approach and risk free rate used making estimation results for MRP to 
vary considerably. Recent historical approach studies calculate the MRP to be between 5% 
and 8%. Prospective approach is based on expectations of academic, investors and managers 
of returns through either surveys or an implied premium approach. Prospective MRP ranges 
between 6% and 8% (Deloitte, 2014). 
 
In order to calculate MRP, the port authority proposed to use the historical Dimson, Marsh 
and Staunton (DMS) approach. The DMS is an annually published dataset of 23 countries 
(including South Africa) annual risk estimates using returns from the year 1900. The main 
advantage of the DMS is that its values are generally stable over time from year to year. An 
arithmetic mean, which measures the average of the annual returns for the period under 
consideration, would then be applied. After that the excess market returns are obtained by 
removing the risk free rate as given by bonds. The ports regulator on its 2012/13 record of 
decision however suggested for the historic returns observed in the past 75 years by the 
(6) 
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Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) to be used (TNPA, 2012b). The JSE returns yield a 
lower MRP than the DMS approach. 
 
Beta (β) is to measure the non-diversifiable risk for an individual company, compared with 
the market as a whole. It measures how the company returns are correlated with the market 
returns. If the beta is greater than one, the security is more volatile than the market average.  
A beta less than 1 indicates that the risk is lower than the average of the market. TNPA is not 
a listed company and it is therefore difficult to obtain beta from trading data and the 
comparator approach is used instead. For the purposes of estimating beta, TNPA firstly 
proposed to use 11 port companies as comparator firms. The appropriate use as proxies to 
beta calculation was questioned and the authority changed and is now using the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) Top 40 companies for this calculation. The JSE Top 40 companies 
were selected because these companies are active both in the domestic and international 
market and seen as a close enough reflector of the business risk that the ports operate under. 
The 5-year average equity beta of these JSE Top 40 companies is then used as it provides 
with avoids the short term shocks and also avoids long term obsolete trends (TNPA, 2013a). 
The competitive environments that the port authority and the JSE Top 40 companies operate 
are different and therefore are not subjected to the similar risks. Firstly the Top 40 companies 
are constantly subjected to competition and they need to strive to gain their competitive edge 
both in the national and international arena. The port authority on the other hand is a 
regulated operator holding a monopoly for its services.  
 
Cost of debt is the amount of cost incurred by the business in compensating its creditors. As 
highlighted above, TNPA is a subsidiary of its parent company, Transnet Ltd, is not able to 
detect its optimal capital structure directly and does not observe its own cost of debt (TNPA, 
2012a). The cost of debt of TNPA then given by the average embedded cost of debt of its 
parent company. This also highlights the inherent complication that the freight logistics 
conglomerate structure brings to the port pricing topic. Given its financial position, TNPA as 
an individual entity may be able to get loans at a lower rate than Transnet.  Company 
structure change of the authority and Transnet Ltd would bring significant changes to the 
process. 
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4.3.3 Operating expenses 
The operational expenses are based on the forecast of costs for the tariff period under 
consideration. These include costs incurred by the port authority and some overheads 
incurred for the parent company (TNPA, 2013a). There is no available explanation on how 
the costs are apportioned in between the subsidiaries towards the upkeep of the parent 
company. As shown in table 7 in the financial year 2011/12 Transnet accounted for 9.96% of 
TNPA actual total operating costs. In 2012/13 it accounted for 11.8% and 10.94% in 2013/14 
TNPA actual operating costs. Another cause of concern is the amount that TNPA budgets for 
Transnet costs which have an impact on the revenue requirement. The budget for 2012/13 
was 93% more than the actual amount of operating costs in 2011/12 and accounted for 
14.96% of the operating expenses that were included in the revenue requirement proposal in 
2012/13. In 2013/2014 the Transnet overheads costs were 15.58% of operating costs on the 
revenue requirement. 
 
Under the revenue requirement method, there is no incentive for the port authority to control 
its operating costs. An increase in operating costs is translated to higher revenue requirement 
rather than a decrease in its profit. These uncontrolled operating costs saw actual operating 
costs of financial year 2012/13 being 3 109 million rands and increasing by 16.92% in 
2013/14. The budget for the 2012/13 was 25.34% higher than actual operating costs of the 
previous financial year. In 2013/14 budget had a difference of 34.77 % to the previous actual 
operating costs. 
 
Table 7: TNPA operating costs (*Rm-million rands) 
 Actual 
Financial 
Year 
2011/12 
(Rm)* 
Budget 
Financial 
Year 
2012/13 
(Rm) 
Actual 
Financial 
Year  
2012/13 
(Rm) 
Budget 
Financial 
Year 
2013/14 
(Rm) 
Actual 
Financial 
Year  
2013/14 
(Rm) 
TNPA Total 
operating cost  
2 505 2 956 2 742 3 537 3 237 
Transnet Group 
Costs  
269 520 367 653 398 
Group 
Percentage to 
TNPA 
Operating Costs 
9.69% 14.96% 11.80% 15.58% 10.94% 
Total Operating 
cost 
2 774 3 477 3 109 4 190 3 635 
 33 
 
Operating cost 
percentage 
increase from 
previous actual 
costs 
19.83% 25.34% 12.07% 34.77% 16.92% 
Source: Author compiled using data from Transnet National Ports Authority Tariff applications 2012 -2015  
In order to address and internalise operating costs would be to use an alternative model of 
pricing, the Rate of Return approach. This method will require the ports regulator to 
determine and set a rate of return that the ports authority would have to receive, increases in 
the operating expenses would lower the return. Application of the rate of return also has its 
short comings and would need to be researched in order to be implemented. A rather simple 
approach to controlling the operating costs of the ports authority would be to cap the costs in 
relation to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and give an additional percentage allowance to 
accommodate increase in activities, say about 3% (SAASOA, 2013). The South African 
Reserve Bank employs the inflation targeting method and CPI range is 3-6 percent, therefore 
operating expenses can be capped at about 10% for the following year. 
  
Since the port authority is not a legal entity for which tax is calculated and paid, the notional 
tax allowance is used in order to establish the tax that the authority would have paid. With 
this approach two important factors are missed, organisations receive tax shied on nominal 
tax, not on the real tax.  The assets are depreciated on a straight line basis over 40 years for 
the service life of each of the asset in the RAB for the tariff period being reviewed, (TNPA, 
2012a). The drawback with this approach is that there is no evidence to support that the 
usefulness of life of the assets of the port authority are 40 years. It is also inconsistent with 
the method used to valuate RAB. 
 
A claw back mechanism is to correct for differences between actual and forecast outcomes in 
previous tariff periods. It used in order to ensure that the port authority or the port users do 
not gain or lose out from inconsistencies between what is forecasted at the time of the tariff 
application and what is observed that may arise because of errors in information, and shocks 
in the system (TNPA, 2012a). This is a good way of trying to correct for the port users but 
the drawback is that the claw-back does not identify from which area of ports authority the 
claw-back is from therefore providing a blanket solution where in truth some port users 
would have been more disadvantaged by the process than the others. A disaggregated port 
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system where each port is considered individually would serve positively to resolving this 
matter. 
 
The Excessive Tariff Increase Margin Credit (ETIMC) is included in the revenue requirement 
in order to offset against significant future tariff increases that would result from future 
capital expenditure programmes (TNPA, 2012a). The increasing of the ETIMC is an 
indication of the inefficiencies of the revenue requirement, what is plausible is that such over 
recoveries can be used to offset future high increase requirements. Since ETIMC is revenue 
collected from port users it should be presented as a separate reserve in TNPA’s regulatory 
balance sheet and the financial return on it deducted from the revenue requirement. 
 
 4.4. Conclusion  
The pricing method being utilised is an accounting pricing method and all applications have 
an accounting analysis behind with limited accommodation of the actual implications that 
might arise for the port user, and the traffic volumes implications for the port authority. There 
had been hard economic times since the economic crisis but there was no relief or even 
freezing of increases that was provided by the ports authority to support its clients. 
 
For any given port, if it charges port users more than what they can benefit, the port user may 
call at an alternative port or dramatically, may stop trading using this mode of transport 
therefore no cargo for the port or transfer the increased costs to their consumer. South African 
container importers and exporters do not have economically sound alternate ports to call, 
ceasing to do business is rather too dramatic and the transfer of costs to the consumer is the 
likely outcome. This will eventually have negative effect on the economy. The South African 
trade volumes through the ports are price inelastic, as proven for containers highlights the 
importance of the ports to the economy. Therefore increasing port price levels will harm the 
trading competitiveness of the containers as the traders will have to absorb these costs. 
Whether these prices are absorbed by the transport providers or get transferred to the end 
customer, thus causing inflationary behaviour would be an interesting area of research that 
this paper does not cover. 
 
The “one size fits all” methodology that is observed in the ports authority pricing system 
possess a threat to the trade, in some trades the consequence is more severe than others as 
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observed from the regression results. Goss and Stevens (2001) highlights that uniform tariff 
systems covering more than one port are still operational in countries with central port 
administrations like Israel (also in South Africa) and argues that the uniform tariff system 
should be replaced with charges that reflect the structure, level of demand and also costs of 
each port individually. It will serve to great benefit if the ports authority would incorporate 
the demand elasticity of each commodity type when port price changes are being determined. 
Since ports are there to serve the trade, it is worthwhile to understand and consider each trade 
impacts before making price adjustments. 
 
The differences between the tariff increases applied for and the tariff increases approved by 
the ports regulator can be partly explained by the differences in application of how individual 
items in the formula are valued as discussed. There is not much reference from Regulator’s 
Record of Decision (RODs) that allows for clear calculation and observable reconciliation of 
the two sets of calculations. This leads to likelihood that there may be other factors that the 
ports regulator takes into consideration when doing it approves the rates. These may include 
its own market research and consultations with industry participants and government. An 
example of this is the financial 2013/14 (as shown in the table 6 above) where TNPA 
requested for a 5.4% on all the tariffs but the ports regulator responded with a cargo 
differentiated price changes. One is not able to draw such differentiation from only the 
information that is provided by TNPA on its applications. 
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Chapter 5: CPV Approach for South African port pricing 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Generally, strategic planning is a process an organisation elects strategies or directions that 
will emphasize its strengths and pursues market opportunities whilst at the same time 
protecting it from threats from the market and compensates for its weaknesses. Port 
management is implemented in three parts: the planning and development philosophy of a 
port which includes its goals and objectives; the port investment criteria and policies; and the 
port pricing polies and techniques. Pricing is most important factor in the process of ports 
implementing its strategic plan. Strategic port pricing can be defined as “the use of pricing as 
a mechanism for achieving competitive advantage” (United Nations Commission on Trade 
and Development, 1995). Pricing can also be used to generate funds that are required to make 
investments in port infrastructure needed in order to increase port capacity and thus ease 
delays and reduce costs to port users waiting for access. 
 
The South African tariff is based on four core principles namely: cost recovery, user pays 
principle, required revenue and competitiveness. Cost recovery principle is based on the 
conception that each tariff should be able to recover the costs that the ports authority incurs in 
providing the infrastructure and service. The user pays principle infers that each port user 
should contribute towards the access and right to the infrastructure and services of the port 
that they utilise.  This means that port users pay for the facilities and services they use. The 
revenue requirement principle refers to the tariff methodology that can be disaggregated to 
each tariff in order to cover operational costs, taxation, and depreciation and for the ports 
authority to gain a fair return on its assets. The competitive principle refers to the 
consideration that the pricing system takes on common practice (TNPA, 2012a). 
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It is worth noting that all the ports authority principles are based on only financial basis. A 
method that will incorporate both financial and operational performance of the ports system 
will serve to benefit both the ports authority and its customers favourably as it will make the 
port have a competitive advantage and at the same time the port users would be receiving 
operative efficient service that the port can offer. Since port beneficiaries all have different 
goals and objectives to derive from the port infrastructure and services, it is well noted that a 
mechanism that will set prices in such a way that all port stakeholders may be taken into 
account is required. Port pricing mechanism should have three elements: cost, performance 
and value (UNCTAD, 1995).  
 
This chapter analyses the Cost-Performance-Value approach as a port pricing technique that 
TNPA can adopt as suggested by UNCTAD (1995). The current port pricing determination 
being followed process is a start and should also incorporate the elements as going to be 
discussed below. The CPV was selected because it allows port management to achieve 
different sets of objectives that will benefit both the port and its users. The CPV approach 
also affords flexible limits to pricing. The minimum price (floor limit) that the port can accept 
is the extra cost that the port authority incurs in serving the port user. The ceiling or 
maximum limit, that the port can charge is the value that is received by the user for the 
provision of the service.  Efficient allocation of resources can serve to increase productivity 
which can lower the floor, making port services cheaper to its users without incurring extra 
costs.  The ceiling can also be raised by providing more capacity. The selection of which 
element is suitable element that can be used for each tariff is determined by examining the 
tariff structure and function of the port, the level and charging unit of a particular tariff item. 
 
The TNPA Tariff book sets out the tariffs that the port authority charges for its service 
provision; these are outlined in table 8 below. The ports authority levies port charges on the 
vessels and cargoes. Vessel specific charges include light dues, vessel traffic services, port 
dues, berth dues, pilotage, tug assistance, floating crane, ship repair services and 
miscellaneous vessel and berthing services.   Cargo related port charges are cargo dues. 
Something worth noting, berthing dues are charged for the provision of the berthing 
infrastructure and there are also berthing services charge in order to tie and untie the vessel to 
the berth levied per vessel. Operationally if one is to operate on a berth, the vessel has to be 
tied to the quay; therefore berthing dues should incorporate the service of tying and untying.   
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Table 8: TNPA Port Service Charges. 
 Service Rendered Application/ Charging Unit 
Light dues  The provision of navigation aids to 
vessels along the South African coast  
Raised per vessel (per gross 
ton) at the first port of call  
Vessel Traffic Services  The provision of vessel traffic 
services, safety of the port 
environment and port control  
Raised per vessel (per gross 
ton) at all ports  
Port dues  The provision and maintenance of 
entrance channels, breakwaters, 
turning basins, navigational aids 
(beacons and buoys inside port limits) 
and maintenance dredging inside the 
port  
Raised per vessel (per gross 
ton), linked to the time that the 
vessel remains in port  
 
Berth dues The provision and maintenance of 
repair quays and other non-cargo 
quay (berth) infrastructure  
Raised per vessel (per gross 
ton), per 24-hour period  
 
Cargo dues  To recover the cargo contribution 
towards the provision and 
maintenance of basic port 
infrastructure  
Raised per unit of cargo, 
differentiated between 
different commodities  
Pilotage  Pilotage assistance to vessels 
entering/leaving the port  
Raised as a basic fee per 
service, plus per vessel (per 
gross ton)  
Tug Assistance  Tug assistance to vessels 
entering/leaving the port  
Raised per service, based on 
the size of the vessel (per 
gross ton)  
Miscellaneous Tug/Vessel 
services  
Tanker fire watch, firefighting and 
standby services  
Raised per service, per hour  
Berthing Services  Berthing services to tie/untie vessels 
at the berth  
Raised per service  
Running of Vessel Lines  Running of lines for vessels entering, 
leaving or shifting  
Raised per service  
Floating Crane Services  Floating crane services rendered to 
the vessels  
Raised per service, per hour  
Ship Repair Facilities Preparation, Docking and Undocking 
of vessels at repair facilities  
Raised per service  
Dry-dock, floating dock, 
synchrolift and slipways  
Dry-dock, floating dock and 
synchrolift fees  
Raised per service for the use 
of a facility, based on the size 
of the vessel (per gross ton)  
Source: Transnet National Ports Authority 
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5.2. Cost based pricing 
This is a historical port pricing approach. The cost element is based on the premise that the 
port authority should recover the costs incurred in order to provide the facilities and services, 
therefore the user should pay for these costs. TNPA currently applies the cost based pricing 
method to all its tariff categories and the necessary changes to make that process more 
efficient were discussed in the previous chapter. Also, instead of using cost based pricing for 
all tariffs the port can only use this method to charge for pilotage, towage, berthing, and 
equipment hire. The other tariffs can be charged using the performance and value approach as 
outlined below. The key hypothesis of the CPV approach is that cost alone should not 
determine the level of tariffs and that is why the next section explores the application of 
performance and value elements to the South African port system. 
 
5.3. Performance-based pricing  
The performance approach refers to a pricing mechanism that is to promote better utilisation 
of port assets. This element encourages efficient behaviour of the users of port facilities 
which can be achieved by using the facility optimally, by taking into account both the time 
the facility is used and the time the users waiting in line to use it. It requires a calculation of 
the optimum level for the port assets and when the level of utilization is below the optimum, 
the tariff is decreased and the tariff is increased when the level of utilisation is above the 
optimum level. 
 
One of the key concerns raised by the ports users is that the ports have low levels of 
performance which at the end of the day increase costs for the users. Firstly because TNPA 
port costs are high in comparison to other ports and also through waiting for ports service as 
this affects vessel operating costs through extended port stays. Comparison study done by the 
Ports Regulator in April 2012 on port productivity revealed that out of the benchmarked 
container ports, the South African Durban and Cape Town container ports had the highest 
port call costs and had the lowest productivity. A realisation was made that if terminal 
operators increase their productivity, costs incurred at the South African ports can be lower.  
The current port pricing system does not have any incentive or penalty currently in place to 
award or reprimand efficient performance, and the user pays even though the service 
provision can be improved. Therefore the performance based pricing could potentially lead to 
port efficiency. The main performance based tariffs are berth hire, which is paid for through 
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berth dues as table 8 above shows and transit storage. The pricing of berth usage should 
encourage speedy turn-around and have high berth productivity. 
 
In order to ensure efficient cargo clearance times, which will increase capacity and possibly 
throughput, transit storage pricing can be a god tool. Transit storage can apply performance 
based tariff by considering the characteristics of the activity. Cargo owners decide whether to 
take short or long term storage. Ports users who require long-term storage may want to use 
the port facilities as long as possible and the port need to ensure that the time allowed for 
cargo is sufficient for the user to collect but also not occupy space that the port could be using 
for accommodation of more cargoes, therefore increasing its throughput. The willingness of 
cargo owners to pay for transit storage depends on the costs of storing the cargo in a 
warehouse outside the port the double handling costs.  Four parameters need to be considered 
when dealing with transit storage: free time, opening daily rate, rate of increase in daily 
charges and intervals between escalations. Transit storage pricing requires knowledge of 
dwell times for cargo distribution.  
 
There should be sufficient time allowed for importers to clear and collect their cargo from the 
port before incurring storage costs. The temporary storage should ensure that rates are set in 
such a way that cargo dwell time is minimised and throughput is maximised. In order to 
execute this, dwell times for the distribution of cargo types should be known and well taken 
care of in the planning and pricing structure. Performance-based pricing can also be practical 
to encourage port users to apply efficient practices while using port facilities. For example, 
the port authority can offer rebates to ships that start to work, give or take, one-hour after 
berthing and by applying surcharges, or fines, to those that start after, say, three hours. The 
success of this method is highly dependent on the quality of assessment, operational and 
commercial conditions and requires careful consideration, an in depth operational 
information for a detailed analysis to be conducted. 
 
5.4. Value-based pricing 
The value-based pricing element is estimated through port users’ willingness to pay the price 
that the port is charging for their services and facilities. It is basically, the port users’ reaction 
to price changes. This is based on the notion that different users have different levels of 
demand and price changes their trading behaviour. 
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An exporter competing with many suppliers from other countries or regions will have a range 
of options over where to deliver their goods to at a competitive price which will be 
determined by the logistics costs. On the other hand an importer who competes with local 
producers of similar goods, other things being equal, and the sensitivity to price will depend 
on the delivered cost relative to the prices to the local goods. Importers and exporters 
therefore have to decide on which transport route to choose based on the logistics costs. Lack 
of alternative transport routes, like in South Africa can leave importers and exporters with no 
choice but to pay the higher fees or stop trading. For importers and exporters this may mean 
competitive advantage on price is lost. The value element suggests that port price should be 
structure on what the traffic can bear which can be assessed by the value that the users place 
on the service provision, as the results of the price elasticity analysis revealed. 
 
In order to allocate benefits, the charges should be reflective of the user, the users’ demand 
characteristics. Value-based tariffs can be applied on port dues on ships and on cargoes. The 
port dues are charged to cover the costs of acquiring and maintaining the waterside 
infrastructure and dredging. In South Africa, charged based on the size and the type of vessel. 
Cargo dues are charged in order to acquire, develop and maintain the landside infrastructure. 
It is important to differentiate between a pricing method that is perceived customer value and 
pricing based on the value of the product. The pricing system based on the value of cargo is 
not considered to be advantageous because the owner of expensive cargo pays more even if 
handling of his cargo is easier than the low cost cargo. It also requires a system to check the 
value of the cargo, for example, physical inspections of the cargo which can interfere with 
port performance. The value based element advocates for pricing to be differentiated 
according to their cargo types value and price sensitivity. Therefore you can have separate 
cargo dues for containers, dry bulk, liquid bulk, break-bulk, depending on which trade 
direction the cargoes are going. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
Pricing is not about only about getting revenues but should be about better utilisation of the 
facilities of the port, attracting more volumes and find ways of decreasing average costs. 
There had been talks from the authority on including performance agreements as part of their 
licence agreements with port operators. When this materialises, it would be a good step in the 
right direction but a price performance related method would serve even a great deal in 
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getting the port to be efficient. Theoretically, it is easy how the performance can be recorded 
but the actual calculations of optimum occupancy rates are not easy to carry out for all assets, 
because of lack of data and the mathematics involved. However, the ports authority should 
thrive to incorporate such calculations in their tariff determination process. 
 
The port pricing formula should be designed to be consistent with the objectives of the ports. 
The Cost, Performance, Value (CPV) is an approach where the ports can utilise in order to 
achieve multiple objectives within the constraints imposed by its financing requirements and 
the external competitive environment. 
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Chapter 6: Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this thesis was to investigate how the South African port system can 
develop an efficient port pricing mechanism taking into account the environment it operates 
in and the objectives it serves to achieve. This chapter serves to provide recommendations 
and provide a conclusion to the thesis. 
 
6.1. Recommendations  
After considering the current pricing system and how the users are affected and providing an 
alternative solution, the most critical element to pricing in South African ports is the 
requirement for practical encouragement of intra-port and inter-port competition. Lack of 
competition within and between the national ports provides little incentive to improve 
management and productivity levels in the ports. One key and yet complex issue that needs to 
be attended to is the Transnet governance structure. Decision making of TNPA is limited to 
the Transnet group, TNPA decisions and policy objectives may be overlooked in order to 
achieve goals that are considered important for the Group or even other divisions. Decision 
process also is prolonged with this bureaucracy, resulting in significant delays in decision 
making on key investments. There is also pricing and competitive conflict of interest in 
having TNPA, a port landlord and TPT, a terminal operator as sister companies. In order to 
achieve competitive, possibly efficient results TNPA should transition into being an 
autonomous entity. This transition can be advantageous as clear responsibilities can be drawn 
and bureaucratic intervention in decision-making will be minimized. It will also afford the 
authority to have its financial credit and taxation system as an entity that are based on its 
business performance rather than decisions that are made by its parent company, making 
easier calculations and inferences to the revenue requirement model. 
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Each port should be able to decide on its own investment, operation, pricing and management 
of resources and improve competition. One of the key bases of the CPV approach, hence the 
suggestion of its application to South African ports is that it is applied to individual ports in 
guiding the port authority and operators, but it cannot be usefully applied by a national port 
authority to set a nationwide port tariff (UNCTAD, 1975). Each port has its own natural 
defined hinterland with specific client base and market, which defines the nature of port 
services and facilities that are provided, and the types of commodities that each port can 
handle. Therefore, each port operates and develops its own pricing system within support a 
defined customer base and facilities that each port possesses. The ports authority needs to 
adopt the “no two ports are the same” ideology into the pricing system. The blanket solution 
to port pricing, is not good to the ports users as the benefit derived is not the same. This will 
lead to a simple tariff determination process, analysed in individual port. The first suggestion 
would be for the complementary system to be removed and allow for competition in between 
ports, even if they all belong to the same port authority. This would make the user pays 
principle achievable. 
 
Costs alone, especially accounting based costs should not determine the tariffs levels. 
Therefore a pricing method that incorporates others objectives should be considered, hence 
the suggested CPV approach. 
 
6.2. Conclusion 
The trading business is highly dependent on the maritime transport system, especially the 
container sector and therefore in order not to hurt the trade by making traders lose their 
competitive advantage, the national ports authority needs to employ methods that do not only 
pertain to their costs but also look at the port system as an instrument at the service of trade 
policy.    
 
It is important that the port authority keeps in mind that the pricing method of a port should 
be designed to last for many years achieving not only present pricing objectives but also 
future ones.  The ports authority needs to consider its strategic position and ensure that it does 
not lose its competitive advantage through inefficient pricing. In coming years as the 
economic climates and neighbouring ports developments can change for the better, making 
worthwhile for the port users to change ports of call, especially for transhipments and cargo 
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that goes through South African ports but are destined for neighbouring landlocked countries. 
There have been some manufacturers based in the Gauteng region in the past few years who 
have taken some of their cargo to the neighbouring port, Port of Maputo because of high cost 
levels and low efficiency of South African ports (NAAMSA, 2013).  
 
Another important element is the proactive attitude that is required on the port authority part 
and the will to understand the port users’ needs and requirements. Therefore the port 
authority needs to invest in analysing its customers’ business and requirements in order to 
provide tailor made service and pricing system rather than a one size fits all solution. Port 
performance can serve to improve port productivity without heavy capital investment; 
therefore employing pricing method that applauds performance will serve positively even for 
future investments.  
 
In protecting the inelastic demanders of port services, regulation will have to be intensified or 
competition be increased. This thesis proposed that competition should be increased. The 
main reason for a call for increased competition rather than regulation is that the regulator 
can only rely on market and academic studies determining the efficient level of costs which 
may or may not be accurate as they will be dependent on assumptions and theory rather than 
practical market operations. Competition allows for incentives for firms to strive for 
efficiency. 
 
There are a number of drawbacks with the implementation of the revenue requirement model. 
Primary to these shortcomings is that the model provides inadequate incentives for the port 
management to apply effort in order to maximise efficiency because revenues are 
significantly linked to capital expenditure and operating expenses. Consequently this can lead 
to over-staffing, poor and unjustified investment decisions, inefficiency, lack of 
responsiveness to customer needs and result in high prices. 
 
The disbanding of Transnet is an extreme measure that would attract some level of political 
and economic implications and therefore may not be feasible in the near future. But TNPA 
can however allow each of the eight ports to have autonomous day to day and strategic 
investment decisions. Port infrastructure developments are not the same for the ports and the 
user-pay principle is violated if the user of another port in another part of the country pays for 
developments that were not done to the port that they used. The tariff system is uniform for 
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all ports even though each port has its own unique characteristics that may give different 
outcomes to port prices, and even creating competitive edge for some ports. Whether or not 
to pursue an increase in competition is an important government policy decision which will 
have a major impact on the future of the freight logistics and South African economy at large. 
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